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The regional voting pattern of the Swedish EU-membership referendum is analyzed to 
determine voters’ preferences over two fiscal regimes: an autonomous Sweden, or 
Sweden as part of the EU. A major difference between these regimes is that autonomy 
gives greater national discretion to handle risk-sharing and redistribution between 
regions. I find that inhabitants of rich and stable regions, with high levels of 
schooling, small receipts of central government transfers, and trade relations 
displaying comparative advantages towards the EU were relatively positive to 
membership. A plausible interpretation is thus that voters in safe and rich regions 
voted in favor of dismantling the Swedish transfer system.  
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1.  Introduction 
 
In 1994, the Swedish voters were given the opportunity to express their opinion on 
membership in the European Union in a referendum. While a majority of voters favored 
EU-membership, the regional variation in the voting pattern was large. In this paper, I 
exploit this variation to gain insights of why people favor European political integration. 
The results show that individuals in economically risky regions were significantly more 
negative to EU-membership. In contrast, inhabitants of high-income regions, with high 
levels of schooling and small receipts of central government transfers, were more positive 
to integration, as were regions displaying comparative advantages in their trade relations 
with the EU.  
 
An important difference between an autonomous Sweden and EU-membership is that the 
EU is a fiscal regime imposing strict restrictions on the national discretion to handle risk-
sharing and redistribution between regions. At the same time, public redistribution and 
risk-sharing between membership countries are limited. Joining the EU hence implies 
leaving a system of regional transfers. In contrast, much of the theoretical literature on 
regional integration and disintegration builds on the premise that integration implies the 
creation of regional transfer schemes.
1 A plausible interpretation of the results in this 
paper is therefore that the inhabitants of safe and rich regions voted in favor of 
dismantling the Swedish transfer system, rather than in favor of European integration as 
such. 
 
There is a large empirical literature on regional integration (e.g. Hess and van Wincoop, 
2000) but there are few empirical analyses of the preferences between different fiscal 
regimes. Panizza (1999) shows that country size, per capita income, ethnic 
fractionalization, and democracy are negatively related to the degree of fiscal centralism, 
defined as the ratio of central to total government expenditure. Since this definition 
concerns the distribution of fiscal power across levels of governance, rather than the set 
of policy options available, these results cannot be directly related to the present study. 
                                                 
1 For surveys of the theoretical literature, see Alesina et al. (1995) and Bolton et al. (1996).   2
Alesina et al. (2000) find that openness to trade mediates the economic benefits of 
country size, and that open trade regimes tend to generate secessions. In contrast, I find 
the composition of trade, but not trade volumes per se, to be a factor determining 
preferences. Unlike previous work, the present paper directly studies voter preferences on 
the decision to integrate. Exploiting regional, rather than country-level data also 
circumvents some of the well-known data problems associated with cross-country 
studies.  
 
2.  Preferences for political integration 
 
The central hypotheses in this paper regarding the effects of regional risk and income 
levels on preferences for different fiscal regimes are developed in Section 2.1. There are, 
however, additional determinants of these preferences that must be controlled for. 
Sections 2.2 and 2.3 discuss other potentially influential regional and individual 
characteristics, respectively. 
 
2.1. Income and risk 
From a local perspective, the choice of whether to enter the EU is really a choice between 
two types of “federal” regimes. One is an autonomous Sweden with the Swedish central 
government as the federal power; the other is Sweden as a part of the EU with the 
European Commission as the federal power. Entering the EU involves renouncing 
national discretion along several dimensions. The Maastricht treaty entails a complete 
loss of monetary autonomy and caps on government borrowing during temporary shocks. 
The EU is also a customs union, leaving Sweden with no discretionary trade policy 
towards third countries. Finally, the inner market builds on strict rules regarding 
industrial subsidies, competition policy, regional aid and public procurement, leaving 
national governments with little discretion in times of industrial crises.
2 Ex post, there is 
little doubt that the EU has indeed limited the discretion of national governments. 
National state aid to industries in the Euro-12 area declined by 30 percent between 1994 
                                                 
2 The EU-rules regulating state aid are summarized in EU (1999).   3
and 1999 (EU, 2000). In the same period, Swedish employment aid to industries declined 
by almost 50 percent and regional aid by more than 20 percent (NUTEK, 2000).
3  
 
Based on this brief description, I argue that the discretionary power to handle regional 
economic shocks through taxes, transfers and industrial policies was greater within an 
autonomous Sweden. In principle, EU-membership could improve regional risk sharing 
by fostering market-based mechanisms (Asdrubali et al. 1996, and Mélitz and Zumer 
1999). However, Sorensen and Yosha (1998) have shown income insurance through 
market mechanisms to be limited within Europe;
4 rather, governments perform the bulk 
of income and consumption smoothing. Hence, the caps on government deficits imposed 
by EU-regulations are likely to impose binding constraints on national consumption and 
income smoothing. Accordingly, both insurance through transfers to regions and 
industries, and stabilization through counter-cyclical government spending are limited by 
EU-membership.
5 Another feature of the EU rules on industrial and regional policies is 
that they limit the national discretion regarding transfers, even when these are aimed at 
regions and industries that are permanently backward. Apart from the support to 
agriculture through the Common Agricultural Policy, CAP, EU support to Swedish 
regions and industries is limited.
6 
 
In conclusion, the choice to enter the EU is a choice between two fiscal policy bundles: 
High insurance/stabilization and high redistribution if Sweden stays outside the EU; low 
insurance/stabilization and low redistribution if it becomes a member. The central 
prediction in this paper thus naturally follows: those standing to gain the most from 
                                                 
3 As a share of total value added in the private sector, state aid has been reduced by about 27 percent from 
1995 to 1999 according to the NUTEK (2000) study. Calculating the full extent of different subsidies is a 
complicated task and the results largely depend on which definitions have been used. In Sweden, one 
estimate of the value of industrial support in 1994 was around 50 billion Swedish kronor (about 5 billion 
Euro). In the same year, corporate income taxation aggregated to 20 billion kronor (2 billion Euro) 
(Barkman and Fölster 1995). To the best of my knowledge, no estimates employing the same methodology 
have been produced at a later date.  
4 It can also be noted that the access to international capital markets does not formally differ between the 
two types of fiscal regimes considered. Capital movements across Swedish borders were completely 
liberalized already in 1991.  
5 It should also be noted that local governments play a limited role in stabilizing local income in Sweden 
through counter-cyclical spending, since they are prohibited to run deficits by law. 
6 The total regional support to Sweden for the period 2000-2006 amounts to around 12 billion Swedish 
kronor  or around 1.3 billion Euro (Näringsdepartementet, 2001)   4
joining the EU are the inhabitants of relatively rich and stable regions, since they tend to 
benefit from the caps imposed on the Swedish transfer schemes. A second implication is 
that regions receiving large transfers from the central government should be less inclined 
to join the EU. 
 
2.2. Other regional determinants  
There is a large set of other regional characteristics that could have influenced voter 
preferences, which must be considered in the analysis. Population size is controlled for, 
to account for the possibility that inhabitants in large cities voted in a systematically 
different way than those in smaller cities. Most studies analyzing the outcome of the 
referendum have found that inhabitants in the north of Sweden were more negative to 
membership (e.g. Gilljam, 1996). For this reason, a north-south trend is included to 
control for this dimension of regional heterogeneity. Furthermore, a variable accounting 
for the post membership growth of industries is also included. The logic is that some of 
the industry growth experience after Sweden actually joined the EU can be ascribed to 
the membership, and that this was predictable to some extent. Hence, inhabitants of 
regions with a large share of rapidly growing industries can be expected to have a 
relatively positive attitude to the EU-membership. 
 
It would also be satisfactory to explicitly account for the potential regional benefits of 
joining the EU. In particular, it is reasonable to expect the costs of trading with the EU to 
be lower for members than for non-members and thus, the regional trading pattern can be 
expected to affect the election outcome. Regions with large trading volumes with the EU 
would have more to gain from political integration than regions with low trading 
volumes. In addition, regions displaying comparative advantages (a large export/import-
ratio) towards the EU should also tend to be more positive to membership. These and 
some other hypotheses will be addressed in Section 4.2. 
 
2.3. Other individual determinants 
Different individuals are likely to have different valuations of EU-membership. For this 
reason, individual characteristics (aggregated to the regional level) are taken into account.   5
Since the EU-membership possibly benefits the well-educated more than the less 
educated, I control for the average years of schooling. Investments in general human 
capital also make individuals less sensitive to industry-specific shocks, thereby making 
the loss of national discretion less important for this group. Underlying political 
preferences are likely to be correlated with the attitudes to EU-membership and are hence 
also controlled for. The voter turnout ratio is also included since it can capture systematic 
differences between opponents and proponents to membership in their propensity to vote. 
Since the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) provides generous benefits to farmers, a 
positive relation between the support for EU-membership and the share of agricultural 
workers in a region can be expected.  
 
3.  Empirical specification, data and measurement issues 
 
In order to empirically assess the determinants behind the attitudes to political 
integration, the regional variation in the support for EU-membership in the Swedish 1994 
referendum is used. The discussion in the previous section gives the following baseline 
relation to be estimated 
 
(3.1)  YESc = β0 + β1RISKc + β2INCOMEc + γZc + εc. 
 
YESc is the percentage of valid votes in favor of membership, RISKc an indicator of 
regional labor market risk, INCOMEc average income, Zc a vector of control variables, εc 
an error term and subscript c the regional indicator.  
 
For a region to be of practical importance to its inhabitants, leaving it must be costly. For 
this reason, the level of analysis is Sweden’s 109 local labor markets, LLM:s. An LLM is 
an analytical region created by Statistics Sweden, based upon the observed commuting 
patterns.
7 Basically, this regional division means that moving costs must be incurred if an 
individual wants to find a job outside his/her LLM. Since LLM:s are not administrative 
                                                 
7 See Statistics Sweden (1998) for a closer description of the LLM subdivisions.    6
regions, the data has been aggregated from the municipal level.
8 Except when otherwise 
stated, the data refers to the election year, i.e. 1994 (see Appendix A for a closer 
description of the data).  
 
3.1.  Measuring labor market risk 
To measure regional risk, I follow the approach used by Conroy (1975) and Diamond and 
Simon (1990) and calculate an indicator of LLM-risk. Based on the idea that LLM:s with 
a large representation of volatile industries are risky, these authors derive what can best 
be described as an augmented Herfindahl index. Every LLM is viewed as a portfolio of 
industries, each subject to random fluctuations. The total degree of LLM-risk is the 
weighted average of the variances and covariances of these fluctuations. The total 
variance in LLM c equals 
 
(3.2)  1,...,109 c   ,   ,   








ss sc c σ σ , 
 
where ssc is the employment share of industry s in labor market c, σss is the variance of 
employment in industry s around a trend, and σsu the covariance of employment between 
industries  s and u. The variance element, σss,  is the variance in the rate of national 
employment growth in industry s, while the covariance elements, σsu, equal the 
covariance between growth rates. The employment growth rate of each industry was de-
trended by taking the first differences of employment at the national level. The 
logarithms of the first differences were then regressed on a time trend. These residuals 
were used to construct the variance/covariance matrix. This procedure is used to capture 
the degree of unexpected variance around the trends.
9 In order to calculate the 
variance/covariance matrix, annual industry employment data at the national level for 43 
industries for the years 1985-1997 is used.
10 
                                                 
8 There were 288 municipalities in 1994. Note that an LLM is never smaller than a municipality, hence 
aggregation is unproblematic. 
9 As will be shown in Section 4.2, the results are not sensitive to the de-trending method. Using first 
differences without a time trend yields consistent results. 
10 There might be alternative indicators of LLM-risk, for example unemployment fluctuations. These are 
not used for two main reasons. First, the unemployment data at my disposal only goes back to 1992.   7
 
3.2. Measurement of other variables 
Defining and measuring most control variables is unproblematic. SCHOOL is the average 
years of schooling; POP the population size; AGRI the share of employment in 
agriculture;  AGE the average age; GRANT the per capita transfers from the central 
government; WELFARE the per capita welfare spending; UEMP the unemployment rate; 
POPDENS the population density; and PUBLIC the share of public employment. Some 
variables merit further description, however. 
 
The percentage share of votes in the 1991 municipal election for the Social Democratic 
Party,  SAP, and the Conservative Party, MODERAT, are used as indicators of the 
underlying political preferences.
11 Using voting data from 1991, I rule out the possibility 
that the voters’ attitudes to the EU affected the voting pattern in the municipal election, 
rather than the other way around. The north-south dimension is accounted for by a 
variable labeled TREND, numbering the LLM:s from south to north. This variable is then 
squared to account for the larger size of LLM:s in the north.
12 In most specifications, the 
TURNOUT-ratio is instrumented for using the turnout ratios of the 1991 and 1994 
parliamentary elections,
13 since this ratio is likely to be endogenously determined by, for 
example, the levels of risk and income. AVCH9497 is a variable taking a high value if an 
LLM had a large share of industries experiencing high growth after the membership. 
 
The discussion in Section 2.2 suggests that regional trading patterns can be important 
determinants of voter preferences. Unfortunately, regional trade data is not available and 
instead, industry trade volumes and export/import-ratios between Sweden and the EU-
                                                                                                                                                 
Second, if people move in response to local unemployment shocks, the unemployment statistics will 
misrepresent the true labor market risk. Another way would be to investigate income fluctuations, but this 
indicator would be severely biased since redistribution has smoothed actual incomes. A third possibility 
would be to calculate local output gaps, but data for such a procedure is not available at this disaggregated 
level.  
11 An attempt is also made to use voting shares of other parties, but these results are not significant. 
12 Squaring is not essential for the results, but somewhat improves the fit of the regression.  
13 The correlations between the turnout ratio of the referendum and the 1991 and 1994 elections turnout 
ratios are 0.65 and 0.61, respectively.   8
area are weighted by the local industry composition. These variables are labeled 




4.1. The baseline specification 
The results from an OLS-estimate of (3.1) are presented in Table 1, column (1).
14 The fit 
of the regression is very good, with an adjusted R
2 of 0.86. This high fit is due to the 
strong geographical component in the voting pattern: a univariate regression between 
YES and TREND yields an adjusted R
2 of 0.51. As can be seen, all significant variables 
have the expected sign. Higher levels of income and schooling, a larger share of workers 
in the agricultural sector, and a larger share of social democratic or conservative 
supporters all seem to have resulted in a more positive attitude to the EU. RISK is 
negative, thereby indicating that a higher LLM-risk decreased the support for the 
membership, while RISK
2 is positive, thereby indicating that this effect decreased with 
higher levels of risk. In fact, the point estimates even suggest that the relation between 
RISK and YES could be reversed at high levels of risk.
15 A logarithmic specification, on 
the other hand, produces a highly significant and negative point estimate (Table 1, 
column 7). Similarly, when using a slightly different risk indicator, a linear specification 
seems to better fit the data (see Section 4.2). TREND is negative, showing that voters in 
the north of Sweden were relatively negative to membership. TURNOUT is also negative, 
suggesting that the larger the share of people who used their right to vote, the more 
negative attitudes to the EU were displayed. POP and AVCH9497 are not statistically 
significant. 
                                                 
14 The term RISK
2 is entered since the fit of the regressions is found to be better using this specification. 
Actually, there is no reason to expect the relationship to be linear. When excluding RISK
2, the coefficient 
on RISK is insignificant at conventional levels.  
15 RISK ranges from around 14 to 72. The coefficients on RISK and RISK
2 indicate that the point at which 
the quadratic function turns from negative to positive is 46.2 (specification 1). This would mean that among 
the LLM:s with high levels of  risk (around the 80
th-90
th percentiles), increased risk is associated with a 
more positive attitude to membership. Although not implausible, this result is highly dependent on the 
precision with which the coefficient of RISK
2 is estimated. By moving towards the lower bound of the 95-
percent confidence interval of the point estimate, the turning point shifts to 3608. Moving to the upper 
bound results in a turning point at 20. Thus, even minor errors in the estimate easily push the turning point 
far outside the relevant interval.    9
 
Due to endogeneity concerns, the turnout ratios from the 1991 and 1994 parliamentary 
elections are used as instruments for TURNOUT in column (2). The point estimate of 
TURNOUT drops sharply and loses its statistical significance, while the point estimate of 
RISK is almost doubled. There is also an increase in the size of the point estimates and 
the statistical significance of the political variables MODERAT and SAP. In column (3), 
POP and AVCH9497 are omitted from the specification, but the results remain stable.  
 
[Table 1 about here] 
 
Although a normality test indicates that outliers do not drive the results, I experiment by 
excluding labor markets with more than 50 percent yes-votes. As seen in column (4), this 
exclusion strengthens the results for RISK, while AGRI, MODERAT, and SAP lose some 
of their significance. Since OLS-estimates can be sensitive to outliers, column (5) reports 
the results from a least median regression that is less sensitive to outliers than OLS, but 
also less efficient. The estimates are similar to the previous ones.
16 Another possible 
problem with the model specification is that the dependent variable is bounded between 
one hundred and zero. This is likely to be of minor importance, however, since YES 
ranges between 17.7 and 65.3. The standard procedure of dealing with bounded 
dependent variables converts it to the form Log(YES/100-YES), but does not affect the 
results to any substantial degree. In columns (6) and (7) of Table 2, Log(YES/100-YES) is 
used as the dependent variable, and in (7), all regressors are entered in logarithms. The 
results for the central variables are stable to these changes.  
 
Establishing significance is a first step; the next question concerns the size of the effects. 
The coefficient of RISK is around -0.27 and that of RISK
2 0.0034 when using OLS, and 
around –0.42 and 0.005 respectively when using 2SLS. Since the standard deviation of 
RISK is 13.3, an increase in RISK by one standard deviation implies a decrease in YES by 
                                                 
16 Upon a close inspection of the explanatory variables, it can be found that four labor markets display such 
a large labor market risk that they can be considered as outliers in the box-plot sense of the word. In an 
unreported set of regressions, these labor markets are excluded from the sample, which results in an 
increase in the point estimates of RISK (-0.37 and -0.64 in the OLS- and 2SLS specifications, respectively). 
Otherwise the results are stable, however.   10
3 percentage points when considering the OLS-estimates and 4.6 percentage points when 
considering the 2SLS-estimates. Since the mean of YES across LLM:s is 41.8, the effect 
is substantial. When increasing SCHOOL and INCOME by one standard deviation, YES 
increases by around 3.5 and 3 percentage points, respectively.  
  
4.2. Further tests and robustness of the results 
In Table 2, some further hypotheses are tested. In column (1), variables proxying for the 
size and composition of the regional trading patterns with the EU, TRADEEU and 
EXPIMPEU, are included. EXPIMPEU has a positive and significant sign, which indicates 
that regions with a large representation of industries with a high export-import ratio did 
tend to be relatively positive to EU-membership. In column (2), the regional per capita 
level of central government transfers, GRANT, is shown to have a negative and highly 
significant point estimate. This provides support for another of the hypotheses presented 
in Section 2.1 – inhabitants of regions receiving large transfers were relatively negative to 
enter the EU.  
 
[Table 2 about here] 
 
In column (3), the RISK-indicator is calculated using the first differences of industry 
growth rates, but without regressing these on a time trend. The basic relationship is robust 
to this change. A regression without RISK
2 (not shown) indicates, however, that a linear 
specification fits the data better in this case. The coefficient on RISK then takes a value of 
-0.15 (p-value 0.000). In columns (4)-(9), some further controls are included to verify 
that the results are not driven by omitted variables. Column (4) contains per capita 
welfare spending
17 and (5) the average age of the population. In (6), the unemployment 
rate is added, in (7) the population density, and in (8) the share of public employment. In 
(9), all new control variables are entered simultaneously. The point estimates of RISK and 
RISK
2 are stable to these inclusions, but the significance level of the coefficient on 
INCOME depends somewhat on the set of control variables. Given the high correlation 
                                                 
17 Swedish welfare assistance is the public income support of “last resort”. In order to qualify, basically no 
wealth or disposable assets can be retained.    11
between income levels, educational attainment, government grants and welfare spending, 
it is not surprising that the individual effect of these variables is hard to pinpoint.  
 
As a further robustness test, I run a number of regressions where the employment shares 
of individual industries are entered in different combinations.
18 The coefficient on RISK 
varies between -0.24 (p-value 0.06) and -0.47 (0.00). RISK
2 takes values between 0.003 
(0.03) and 0.006 (0.00). INCOME is less robust (although significant in a large majority 
of cases) and varies between 0.03 (0.70) and 0.20 (0.00). SCHOOL ranges between 6.48 
(0.01) and 12.81 (0.00). Not surprisingly, the proxy for trading patterns, EXPIMPEU, is 
sensitive to control variables accounting for the regional industry structure. It takes on 
values between 0.37 (0.79) and 3.19 (0.00). GRANT ranges between -0.30 (0.13) and -
0.78 (0.00), but is quite stable around -0.70 (p-values <0.01). 
 
4.3. The spatial dimension 
When using regional data, some special econometric problems might arise. Basically, 
attitudes to the EU can “spill over” between regions, i.e. we could have a spatial 
autocorrelation problem (see Appendix B and Anselin, 1988). Since unobservable 
regional characteristics cannot be controlled for in a cross-sectional setting, it might be 
particularly important to account for spatial autocorrelation in such a study. Spatial 
spillovers might result in a systematic correlation between the dependent variable across 
regions (spatial lag structure), and OLS would yield biased estimates. Alternatively, the 
error terms can be systematically correlated across regions, but it is not the voting pattern 
per se that lies behind the correlation (spatial error structure). Then, the OLS-estimates 
will be inconsistent. To check the robustness of the results for these types of spillovers, a 
regional weight matrix of the dimension 109×109 is created. The elements in this matrix 
take the value of one if two regions are neighbors, and zero otherwise. This weight matrix 
is then used to test the baseline specification for a spatial structure of the data. Although 
LM-tests for spatial lags and errors indicate that spatial autocorrelation is indeed present, 
                                                 
18 First, the employment share of each industry is entered, one at a time. Then, a number of combinations of 
five and seven industries are used. Apart from industry shares of employment, the same set of control 
variables as in Table 2, column (2) is used (results available upon request).   12
the results for the central variables essentially remain unchanged when explicitly 
accounting for the spatial dimension (results available upon request). 
 
5.  Conclusions 
 
The determinants of the regional voting pattern from the Swedish 1994 EU-membership 
referendum are studied, with particular attention given to risk-sharing and redistribution. 
An increased degree of local labor market risk reduced the support for membership. 
Regions with high average income- and educational levels, small receipts of central 
government transfers, and trade patterns displaying comparative advantages towards the 
EU were relatively positive to membership.  
 
At a superficial level, these results appear to contradict both Persson and Tabellini (1996) 
and Bolton and Roland (1997). The former show that regions subject to large 
idiosyncratic shocks have stronger incentives to join a union than stable regions, while 
the latter present a model where poor regions are more prone to integrate since they stand 
more to gain from inter-regional transfer schemes. Based on the strict regulations 
regarding discretionary policies within the EU, a more reasonable interpretation is 
available. From the individuals’ perspective, joining the EU could be described as leaving 
a system of regional income transfers and risk-sharing, whereas unification in the above-
mentioned models implies the creation of inter-regional transfer schemes. The 
inhabitants of stable and rich regions receiving little central government assistance could, 
in other words, be said to have voted for the dismantling of the Swedish transfer system, 
rather than for integration with the EU per se. This interpretation highlights the 
importance of defining what “regions” and “unions” actually are, especially in models 
based on individual political choice.    13
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Appendix A. Data 
 
All data is from Statistics Sweden, except unemployment data which is from AMS, the central body among 
Sweden’s labor market authorities. Except where indicated, data refers to the year 1994. Data on Sweden’s 
288 municipalities has been aggregated to the local labor market level (109 observations). Data on the 
industry level is divided into 43 industries according to Statistics Sweden’s “limited level”-classification 
(which follows the NACE-classification). 
 
YES: The share of (valid) votes in favor of EU-membership (×100). Mean: 41.79. Std: 10.49. Skewness: -
0.31. 
AGE: Average age in years. Mean: 40.28. Std: 1.63. Skewness: 0.19. 
AGRI: Share of employment in agriculture. Mean: 0.025. Std: 0.015. Skewness: 1.17. 
AVCH9497: Weighted average industry growth rate between 1994 and 1997. Defined as Σ
n
s 1 = ssc{(Ls,1995 + 
Ls,1996 + Ls,1997)/3 - Ls,1994) / Ls,1994}, where Ls,t is the national employment in industry s at time t and ssc is the 
share of employment in industry s and LLM c in 1994. Suppose an LLM only consists of industries A and 
B and that these are of equal size in 1994. If industry A grows (at the national level) by 10 percent between 
1994 and 1997 and industry B declines at the same rate, then AVCH9497 will be zero. Mean: -0.0009. Std: 
0.0039. Skewness: 0.669. 
EXPIMPEU: Weighted export-import ratio with the EU. Defined as Σ
n
s 1 = ssc{Exports / Imports} where 
Exports (Imports) are the national exports (imports) to (from) the EU-member states (in 1994) in thousands 
of Swedish kronor and ssc is the share of employment in industry s and LLM c in 1994. Mean: 1.28. Std: 
0.37. Skewness: 2.40.  
GRANT: Per capita grants from central to the municipal government in thousands of Swedish kronor. 
Mean: 7.34. Std: 3.73. Skewness: 0.90. 
INCOME: Income per family at work in thousands of Swedish kronor. Mean: 156.03. Std: 8.83. 
Skewness: 0.24. 
MODERAT: Percentage of votes cast in favor of the Conservative Party in the 1991 municipal election. 
Mean: 16.18. Std: 5.73. Skewness: 0.34. 
POP: Number of inhabitants. Mean: 80884.2. Std: 199266.2. Skewness: 6.49. 
POPDENS: Number of inhabitants per square kilometer. Mean: 30.09. Std: 36.29. Skewness: 0.19. 
PUBLIC: Share of public employment. Mean: 35.27. Std: 6.70. Skewness: 0.06. 
RISK: Indicator of labor market risk. Defined as: Σ
n




ss  + Σ
n
s 1 = Σ
n
u 1 = sscsucσσυ , s ≠ u, where ssc and suc 
are the shares of employment in industries s and u in LLM c in 1994. σss is the variance of employment in 
industry s around a trend, and σsu the covariance of employment between industries s and u. The variance 
element, σss, is the variance in the rate of national employment growth in industry s, while the covariance 
elements, σsu, equal the covariance between growth rates. The employment growth rate of each industry 
was de-trended by taking the first differences of annual employment at the national level between 1985 and 
1997. The logarithms of the first differences were then regressed on a time trend. The residuals from these 
regressions were used to construct the variance/covariance matrix. Mean: 31.81. Std: 13.36. Skewness: 1.12 
SAP: Percentage of votes cast in favor of the Social Democratic Party in the 1991 municipal election. 
Mean: 41.53. Std: 7.87. Skewness: 0.29. 
SCHOOL: Average years of schooling. Mean: 10.65. Std: 0.32. Skewness: 0.88 
TRADEEU: Weighted trade with the EU. Defined as Σ
n
s 1 = ssc{Exports + Imports} where Exports (Imports) 
are the national exports (imports) to (from) the EU-member states (in 1994) in thousands of Swedish 
kronor and ssc the share of employment in industry s and LLM c in 1994. Mean: 1.01×10
7. Std: 7079234. 
Skewness: 1.96. 
TREND: Each LLM is numbered from south to north. TREND is defined as the square of this numbering. 
Mean: 4015. Std: 3589. Skewness: 0.63. 
TURNOUT: The percentage of eligible voters who actually cast their votes. Mean: 82.59. Std: 2.07. 
Skewness: -0.98. 
UEMP: Total unemployment rate. Mean: 13.07. Std: 2.80. Skewness: 0.25. 
WELFARE: Per capita welfare spending in thousands of Swedish kronor. Swedish welfare spending is the 
cash support of last resort and covers the basic living expenses. Mean: 0.83. Std: 0.33. Skewness: 0.30.   16
 
[Table A1 here] 
 
Appendix B. Spatial econometrics 
 
In the spatial lag case, the flowing relation is estimated: 
 
(A.1)   yc = γ Ω yc + β xc + εc , 
 
where  Ω is a regional weight matrix of dimension 109 × 109 and γ is the coefficient of Ωyc   in the 
regression. The elements in the weight matrix take the value of one if two regions are neighbors and zero 
otherwise. 
 
In the spatial error case, the following relation is estimated: 
 
(A.2)   yc = β xc + λ Ωεc + ηc , 
 
where  Ω is the regional weight matrix. The error terms from OLS-estimates, εc, are in this case 
systematically correlated across regions. Since the autoregressive coefficient λ is not known, a maximum 
likelihood estimation must be carried out. 
 
   17
 
 
Table A1: Correlations between main variables of interest: 
 YES  RISK 
 












            




           






          








         









































































































   














































































P-values in parenthesis. YES is the share of votes in favor of EU-membership. RISK is the indicator of labor market risk. TREND is the (squared) south-north 
numbering of the LLM:s. SCHOOL is the average years of schooling. INCOME is the average income per working family. POP is the population size. 
AVCH9497 is the weighted average of industry growth between 1994-97. TURNOUT is the voter turnout ratio. MODERAT is the share of votes cast for the 
conservative party in the 1991 municipal election. SAP is the share of votes cast for the Social Democratic party in the 1991 municipal election. AGRI is the 
share of agricultural workers. GRANT is the per capita transfers from central to local governments. EXPIMPEU is a proxy for the regional export-import ratio 
with the EU. TRADEEU is a proxy for the regional trade volume with the EU.  There are 109 observations. 
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ADJ. R
2  0.86 0.82 0.83 0.70 0.59 0.81 0.61 
#  OBS  109  109  109 84 109  109  109 
White’s standard errors have been used. P-values in parenthesis. Instruments for TURNOUT in 2SLS-estimates are the turnout ratios 
from the 1991 and the 1994 parliamentary elections. In columns (1)-(5), the dependent variable is YES. In column (4), labor markets 
with more than 50% yes-votes are dropped from the sample. In column (5), a least median regression technique is used. In columns 
(6) and (7), the dependent variable is Log(YES/100-YES) and in column (7), all variables are entered in logarithms.  
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WELFARE      3.059 
(0.045)
     2.750 
(0.076)
AGE       0.452 
(0.467)
    0.515 
(0.354)
UEMP        0.052 
(0.833)
   -0.023 
(0.919)








      
ADJ. R
2  0.83 0.85 0.85 0.85 0.85 0.84 0.84 0.84 0.86 
White’s standard errors have been used. P-values in parenthesis. All regressions also include AGRI, MODERAT, SAP, TURNOUT, 
TREND and a constant. TURNOUT is instrumented for using turnout ratios from the 1991 and the 1994 parliamentary elections. In 
column (3), RISK and RISK
2 are calculated using first-differenced industry level time series, without regressing these on a time trend. 
 
 
 
 
 